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 WHEN ADAPTATION ELUDES TRANSFORMATION
The Losing Game of Portuguese Territories within the 
Context of Europe 
 What may be the expected effects of European integration on Portuguese regions, 
referring to the role of Community funding in public sub-national activity? The 
inclusion of Portuguese local and regional entities within the European context 
opens up new opportunities in a new administrative environment. This should 
influence the socio-political practices under which they usually operate. Significant 
consequences are also to be expected in the way they act, especially bearing in 
mind that Portugal is one of the countries that has benefited most from European 
regional policy. To what extent this has led to a modernization of the Portuguese 
political system, considering specifically the principles of transparency, subsidiar-
ity and participation which are promoted by European discourse? These should 
lead to an enhanced role of territorial forces in the decision-making processes. 
 Quand l’adaptation élude la transformation. 
 Le jeu perdant des régions portugaises dans le contexte européen 
 Quels impacts peut-on attendre de la construction européenne dans les régions 
portugaises, notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle des fonds communautaires 
dans l’activité politique subnationale ? L’insertion d’acteurs territoriaux portugais 
dans le contexte européen les met en contact avec de nouvelles opportunités et 
référentiels de gouvernance, qui ont des répercussions dans leurs pratiques socio-
politiques habituelles. On peut donc s’attendre à des effets non négligeables dans 
leur manière d’agir, surtout si l’on tient compte du fait que le Portugal est un 
des pays européens les plus fortement marqués par la politique régionale com-
munautaire. Dans quelle mesure cette circonstance mène-t-elle le système politi-
que portugais à se moderniser, selon les règles de transparence, subsidiarité et 
participation promues par les normes européennes, notamment en ce qui concerne 
le respect du rôle des forces territoriales dans les processus de décision ? 
 Quando adaptação não rima com transformação. 
 O jogo de ilusões dos territórios portugueses no contexto europeu 
 Quais os impactos esperáveis da construção eu ropeia nas regiões portuguesas, 
tendo em conta, nomeadamente, o papel dos fundos comunitários na actividade 
política sub-nacional ? A inserção das figuras territoriais portuguesas no contexto 
europeu mete-as em contacto com novas oportunidades e referenciais governa-
tivos, os quais deverão repercutir-se nas suas práticas socio-políticas habituais. 
Reflexos importantes serão pois de prever na sua actuação. Sobretudo, se se tiver 
em mente que Portugal é um dos países fortemente tocados pela política regio-
nal comunitária. Discute-se aqui em que medida essa circunstância levou o sistema 
político português a modernizar-se, seguindo as regras de transparência, subsida-
riedade e participação promovidas pela norma europeia, mormente no que diz 
respeito ao papel das forças territoriais nos seus processos de decisão. 
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 The reinforcement of decentralised authorities is one of the banners of the European Union. Hooghe & Marks (1996: 207) even state that “the diversification and 
intensification of political activity at a subnational level are the most important 
features of European integration”. This means that the variety of resources, the 
institutional learning and the guiding principles of the European Union – “une 
nouvelle vision du monde référée à l’action publique locale” (Négrier 1995: 45) – exert a 
strong influence over the conduct of the subnational authorities. In this way, the 
construction of Europe will consolidate the importance that the various territorial 
arenas, institutions and leaders had already acquired in the recomposition of 
political life across Europe1. 
 Several factors explain the devolution of power into the hands of subnational 
entities. Firstly, the pressure for greater efficiency in public affairs, because central 
mechanisms of regulation are considered slow, distant and excessively bureaucratic. 
Secondly, the phenomena of deregulation, privatisation and increasing social com-
plexity, which requires flexible responses involving various government bodies and 
social groups. Finally, the methodology associated with the European programmes, 
aimed at encouraging the cooperation between different levels of power and 
stimulating local authorities to take on a stronger leading role. This has been 
called ‘multi-level governance’. 
 ‘Proximity’ becomes the common issue for procedures addressing the modern-
ization of politics and the revitalisation of the public sphere. On the one hand, 
‘proximity’ refers to the contexts where mediations necessary for the success of 
public policies are considered to reside. The aim is to reinstate effective govern-
ment, reconcile citizens with their representatives, fight exclusion and strengthen 
collective identities from below. In addition, proximity meets the demands of the 
European Union, intellectually mobilised behind principles such as subsidiarity and 
participation, placed at the operational core of its programmes2. 
 To understand these developments and their underlying assumptions, one of the 
concepts most frequently employed is that of ‘governance’. It is clear that gover-
nance has not yet acquired the theoretical stability necessary to achieve a univer-
sal definition. Being the “structured ways and means in which the divergent 
preferences of interdependent actors are translated into policy choices “to allocate 
‘values’, so that the plurality of interests is transformed into co-ordinated action 
and the compliance of actores is achieved” (Eising & Kolher-Koch 1999: 5), it may 
encompass several modes and patterns of political action. However, the concept of 
governance always refers to the decentring of the state in the majority of today’s 
decision-making process. This implies a significant reconfiguration of political are-
nas, which has already been named a repeuplement (Massardier 2003). In governance 
1  Extending the changes that had already placed decentralization at the centre of national 
agendas. 
2  The politics of local development, for example, are part of “une recherche plus globale de modèles 
de développement susceptibles de mobiliser le plus grand nombre possible d’individus” (L  -G  
1999: 10). A significant amount of European funding was therefore based on the assumption of 
“servir à la mise en place de mesures qui assurent la participation démocratique et l’implication des citoyens. 
Pour la Commission, les actions régionales manquent en effet d’efficacité si elles ne s’accompagnent pas d’une 
mobilisation de l’ensemble des acteurs (publics et privés) au niveau local” (ibid.: 11). 
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theories, public action is viewed as the result of the increasing interdependence of 
networks of actors, both public and private and central and local, who are essen-
tially linked by contractual practices (Le Galès & Thatcher 1995, Gaudin 1999). 
Power is seen as disseminated across many spheres, both sectoral and territorial, 
in which it is used strategically, as a way of structuring the multiple negotiations 
that precede and accompany any form of institutional action3. 
 Governance and the Consecration of Actors by ‘Europe’ 
 Notions of networking and governance have been widely applied to the process 
of the territorialisation of public policies. The renewal of interest in territory and 
its actors has arisen because the state, under the changes of decentralization and 
Europe, has lost its prerogative as the exclusive locus of power, being intersected 
by multiple circles of authority, particularly those of a territorial nature. Equally, 
analyses increasingly report modes of political and economic regulation based on 
territory, following an urban or regional logic. Given the European tendency 
for the withdrawal – or recomposition (Wright & Cassese 1996) – of the state in 
the face of market forces and social complexity, it is being accepted that interme-
diate territories, such as cities and regions, could provide an effective level for 
socio-political integration, organization and regulation (Le Galès 2003). This means 
that groups, organizations and interests of an eminently territorial nature may 
take shape and, in the most advanced cases, will be able to define their own 
strategies in the light of external representation, namely through the European 
Union (Jeffery 1997). 
 It should, however, be noted that the probability of these governance practices 
applying to genuine collective territorial actors (Agnew 1987, Le Galès 2003) var-
ies according to circumstances in each area. The type of economic development, 
the traditions of civic cooperation (Putnam’s ‘social capital’), national political 
cultures etc., play an important role. 
 Another concept useful for territorial approaches should be mentioned: that of 
‘political exchange’. The use of the ‘political exchange’ tool is particularly relevant 
when studying the links that subnational territories forge with the processes related 
to European integration. The exchanges promoted by Communitarian policies 
between representatives of the European bodies and local entities reveal, for 
instance, the phenomena of cooperation and reciprocal legitimacy between actors 
related to different spheres and institutional logics, working together at levels rang-
ing from the local to the supranational. The pattern is usually that of the transla-
tion of European concepts into the local universes (Négrier 1995). 
 Territorialized political exchanges may, however, differ from one region to 
another. This happens because not all regions are prepared to become forums for 
European policies. Many are incapable of reconciling 
“ les intérêts selon une logique à la fois verticale (entre différents niveaux) et horizontale de représenta-
tion des intérêts privés et publics, [débouchant sur] un compromis territorialisé qui repose sur la 
3  From local authorities to Community institutions, negotiation is the most salient feature of 
contemporary working practices. 
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régulation des interactions entre différents réseaux (fonctionnaires européens et nationaux, déconcentrés ou 
non, experts, agents de développement, scientifiques, représentants professionnels, corps techniques, etc.).” 
 In conclusion, 
“la capacité régionale à ‘capturer’ l’échange politique, à incarner un forum des politiques  européennes, 
est liée à la nature des médiations qui se construisent à leur occasion, ainsi qu’à un ensemble de 
phénomènes qui relèvent davantage des caractéristiques nationales. (Négrier 1995: 50-52) ”
 For this reason, regions may simply be arenas, rather than forums, for territorial 
politics. In many situations, the regional level is just “un espace d’échanges politiques 
parmi d’autres, sans capacité supérieure de coordination et de négociation entre intérêts territoriaux” 
(Négrier 1999: 123). In this case, the fragmentary nature of the networks involved 
in European policies, reproducing institutional and political cleavages or infra-
regional clashes, leads to a situation in which “le rôle officiel de programmation régionale 
[soit] en réalité celui d’un espace secondaire, une chambre d’enregistrement de compromis con-
struits ailleurs” (p. 124). No ‘regional interest’ emerges able to defuse conflicts between 
subregional interests, networks or institutions. The opposing political cultures, 
public and private interests, economic and social perspective, etc. are given free 
expression .
 This happens because, amongst other factors, the functioning of the European 
Union (EU) does not impose effective multi-level governance as a typically 
‘European’ form of administration. Regions and other territories often resent the 
fact that their role as representative intermediaries has not been sufficiently well-
established. Europeanization, as the gradual diffusion-penetration of values, norms 
and decisions from European to domestic institutions, is still a long way from 
creating a new constitutional situation within member states of the Union (Kohler-
Koch 1998: 53). The requirement for territorial actors to be privileged interme-
diaries in public policies (particularly in projects financed by European funding) 
has to be evaluated in the light of contextual circumstances4. 
 At best, the guiding principles, practices and rules promoted by the European 
Community constitute an ‘offer’ related to the transfer of funds, representing a 
proposed means for territorial agents to deal with the Commission and also recom-
mended economic and political concepts and strategies to improve development in 
their area – “a window of opportunity, an offer which, in each individual case may, 
or may not match the demand of individual actors” (Kohler-Koch 1998: 41). 
 The European Union has consequently allowed its principles and means of 
intervention to be shaped by national political/administrative cultures. Globally 
the impact of Community policies on territories may be considered on the basis 
of three distinct scenarios (Balme & Jouve 1996). Firstly, the consolidation of 
traditional policy networks, linked to state bureaucracies, reinforcing their territo-
rial position through their role as European policy interlocutors; secondly, the 
4  The Commission normally avoids interfering in the networks that organize public policies 
at the national level, as a way of preventing mistrust amongst Member Sates. In addition, out-
side the domain of structural funding, “the Commission shows little interest in the regions and 
works more closely with national governments. In general terms, the Commission needs states 
and it is more interested in political efficiency than in efficient measure to address the broader 
issues of political restructuring” (K  & P  1998: 41). 
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superimposition of new policy networks, emerging from access to the European 
system. This, however, may not necessarily imply a reorganization of the political 
system and a change in the structural conditions under which territories operate; 
finally, the substitution scenario, referring to the creation of new policy networks 
and leading to a reinvention of the political system. 
 The Portuguese Case 
 The Portuguese case may be analysed in the light of these hypotheses. As one of 
the countries that has most benefited from European regional policy, one should 
expect that its adaptation to Community procedures through regional funding 
would have a significant impact, particularly considering that when it joined the 
European Economic Community in 1986, Portugal was still one of the most cen-
tralised countries in Europe. Significant changes were envisaged due to the contact 
with the methods and style of government encouraged by Brussels, for example, 
concerning the way territorial representation proposed by Europe would be absorbed 
into the political system, structured upon more traditional, party-political and 
functional forms of mediation. These expectations were in line with appeals for 
subsidiarity and the participation of regional entities in implementing Community 
projects. 
 However, it is important to remember that Portugal’s entry into the European 
project occurred parallel to its democratic transition. This was a decisive factor 
because the reconstruction of the country according to democratic criteria – asso-
ciated with the territorial penetration of political parties and the revitalisation of 
local powers, creating a new framework for centre-periphery transactions – merited 
absolute priority. Europe would provide, at best, an ‘external’ impetus for the 
political and economic modernization of the country. 
 Unfinished decentralization, Europeanization ‘on the doorstep’ 
 The objectives of decentralization played an important part in the political/insti-
tutional movement following the 1974 Revolution. An ambitious decentralization 
programme was inscribed in the 1976 Constitution. Besides the creation of the 
autonomous regions of the Madeira and Azores islands, formalised in 1979, it also 
included the transfer of competences and autonomy (which did not exist during 
the dictatorship) to the municipalities, viewed as the natural basis for the demo-
cratic learning of citizens and the objectives of the country’s infrastructural devel-
opment. This took place in a Portugal that was, in general, impoverished and 
facing a serious economic crisis. 
 A project to create administrative regions in continental Portugal was also 
included in the Constitution. Inspired by the territorial reforms that countries such 
as France and Italy were developing at the time, the implementation of regions, 
rather than districts, as regional autarquias (local government) was to be “the main 
constitutional innovation in terms of local government structure” (Canotilho & 
Moreira 1993: 254). Decentralization, it was said, “is another name for freedom”. 
 The fate of the regions is crucial. It confronts some of the most fundamental 
assumptions about Europeanization with their effective counterpart within national 
systems. In the case of Portugal, this is particularly true, since the troubled path 
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of regionalization, which was finally voted down5, illuminates some of the most 
striking factors that explain the failure of the political system to converge with the 
values and methods associated to European governance. As regional politics rep-
resents a vehicle for the modes of government promoted by the European 
Community, the regional scenarios constitute a privileged laboratory in which 
‘Europeanization’ can be tested. As Faure recalls (2000: 35), in terms of com-
parative European politics, various studies have shown that “les scènes infranationales 
dans lesquelles se développent de nouveaux compromis sociaux possèdent un centre de gravité 
régional assez structurant ”. 
 Regionalization or the Experience that Never Came 
 In Portugal after the Revolution the regions benefited from the same support as 
the ‘classic’ municipalities and parishes6. Together they were supposed to bring 
administration closer to the citizens, ensuring effective representation for the 
different territorial levels envisaged: local, regional and national. Ignoring, at this 
point, the problem of the regional map to be defined7, the regions were to be 
strengthened by their legitimacy throughout Europe, corresponding to values of 
transparency, democracy, political participation, efficiency and socio-economic 
equity. It was argued that regionalization was “necessary to improve democracy”, 
although its material objective was to facilitate economic progress in the different 
national regions. It should be noted that we are referring to a functional rather 
than a political form of regionalization (Quermonne 1963). It was a project inspired 
by the precepts of economic planning and regional economics in vogue, rather 
than the fulfilment of any form of political regionalism. In fact, traces of region-
alism can only be seen in the Azores, which is not surprising if we consider the 
absence of traditions of true regional forces or feelings in Portugal (where not 
even feudalism existed). 
 Despite this, multiple blockages and contradictions began to undermine the 
process of regionalization. A series of impediments was constructed over the years, 
all contributing to confining regions to the limbo of constitutional symbolism. That 
regionalization was not a self-fulfilling constitutional prophecy is the least we can 
say. In reality, any approach to regionalization means grasping the pragmatic 
reasons for its abandonment, paradoxically accepted by the political forces without 
visible trouble. 
5  With the ‘no’ vote triumphing in the referendum held in November 1998. 
6  Although this soon vanished. The municipalities and parishes became the only genuinely accepted 
structures. The principles of regionalization were still legitimate but the practices were subverted. 
7  Regionalization was supposed to appropriate the regional map of deconcentrated state services 
(the four Commissions for Regional Development of the time – North, Central, Lisbon and 
South) created in the sixties for the purposes of regional planning, which basically corresponded 
to the areas covered by the present-day Commissions for Regional Coordination and Development. 
The aim was to give them the status of local authorities, that is, to make them elected bodies, 
with their own competences and administrative and financial autonomy. It should be noted that 
a certain technocracy already functioning in the CCRs, experienced in working with universities 
and local agents, was to prove important in bringing the regions into the Constitution. 
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 In fact, the regions did not gather the necessary political, social and institutional 
allegiances to impose themselves within the administrative corpus of the country. 
This means we are facing a state which has failed to meet its commitment to the 
Constitution and a collection of political parties who have ignored their own 
manifestos, considering that all parties had included regionalization in their agen-
das and regions had never created any ideological divisions or doctrinal incompat-
ibility amongst them. Although there were eventual disagreements over the regional 
map, all the political parties had publicly affirmed their dedication to its imple-
mentation. In the end, however, it came to represent something to invest in when 
in opposition or during election periods. Once in power, regionalization proved 
itself to be ‘dispensable’. 
 The rhetoric of regionalization, prolific over the years, finally ended up serving 
only the ambitions of individuals and groups aiming for a better position within 
the existing system. In other words, it served actors looking for more advantageous 
positions within the state apparatus, which they had really never wanted to trans-
form and whose functioning was based on a political culture where regions appeared 
to be dispensable or even dangerous. As Barreto summarises (1998: 22-23), 
“the more fragile or unstable powers sought in regionalization a means of enlarging 
their support base, whilst the established or longer-lasting powers ignored it. The result 
was a kind of dead-end street: regionalization, given its importance, needs a strong 
power behind it, which, being strong already, has no interest in it. ”
 In terms of public scrutiny, it was only when the referendum approached (November 
1998), that regionalization broke out of its narrow political confines. Even though 
at the beginning of the 1980s, together with the Livro Branco sobre Regionalização 
(“White Paper on Regionalization”, published by the Aliança Democrática government, 
a centre-right coalition), the issue had been debated passionately, this enthusiasm 
was short-lived. When the socialist Mário Soares became Prime Minister in 1983, 
the project was abandoned and only taken up again in the latter half of the 1990s 
by António Guterres, surprisingly another socialist. At the time, however, region-
alisation had become embroiled in political confusion. For some people, following 
the argument of the previous Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva (PSD, Partido Social-
democráta, Social Democratic Party, centre-right), the project would increase bureau-
cracy and state spending, prejudice the municipalities and damage national 
integrity by setting regions against each other. Equally it would introduce regional 
caciquismo and territorial egoism. For others, it would be completely the opposite. 
Once again, the expectations of those politically involved in the discussion were 
focused on various different goals, amongst which regions were eventually absent. 
 Typically, regionalisation fades within the political system, its main issues being 
instrumentalised by the dominant controversies, actors and coalitions of the moment. 
Forced into a cyclical existence, according to how useful it appeared to party tactics 
or election gains, it ultimately fell into ambiguity and impasse proving that regions 
did not represent a form of territorial organization that the state might be interested 
in promoting or increasing. In almost thirty years of debating and building democ-
racy, regions have remained a constitutional ‘no-man’s land’ (Keating 1996: 9). 
 Regionalization is conspicuous by its absence in many plans. As far as political 
democratisation is concerned, the main purpose of the political parties always 
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involves their presence at the heart of the state apparatus, rather than any inter-
est in decentralization. Some aspects of regionalization would even have seemed 
dangerous, given the weak territorial penetration of party organizations and new 
political powers. As Pellegrino recalled (et al. 1986: 121): 
“Ces dix dernières années, on peut situer les grandes causes du blocage du processus de régionalisa-
tion, non seulement dans l’incapacité réelle du pouvoir central à découper l’espace (problèmes de 
délimitation des régions administratives, de déconcentration de fonctions, de décentralisation de com-
pétences), mais aussi dans l’instabilité et la fragilité du pouvoir politique dans le cadre du nouveau 
régime démocratique. Cela a eu pour conséquence une primauté donnée par les partis politiques aux 
formes de “centralisme plutôt qu’à celles de pouvoirs locaux ou régionaux centrifuges”, dans la mesure 
où une régionalisation aurait pu signifier l’affaiblissement des forces politiques instituées ; forces pour 
lesquelles des espaces bien délimités constituent des supports nécessaires. Multiplier les niveaux de 
représentation est apparu désormais non seulement comme un affaiblissement du pouvoir central, mais 
aussi comme une menace pour les partis politiques implantés ; les forces politiques ont encore accen-
tué dans les faits l’action traditionnelle de frein du pouvoir central, menant ainsi à un blocage du 
processus de régionalisation.”
 In addition, it was assumed that regionalization would place one third of national 
territory (the Alentejo region in the south) in the hands of the Communist Party, 
a circumstance that imposed a kind of implicit veto on the project. 
 Moreover, if state efficiency implied increased decentralization via the regions, 
this was not reflected in the models of action favoured by the actors within the 
system – in particular those most active in the renewed centre-periphery channels 
– regarding their personal trajectories and influence. Given the absence of genu-
ine regional interests and all the political parties’ dedication to gains within the 
central state apparatus, regionalization did not durably serve the interests of any 
particular elite whose political prospects depended on regional institutions. Hence 
the difficulty in perceiving the advantages of regions for individual careers, as well 
as the reason why few actors within the parties appeared likely to become future 
regional leaders. Divided between the local ‘people’ and the national leading 
figures, the political parties made regionalization a matter of internal adjustments, 
a personal issue important only to a minority who, once the party was back in 
power (following the alternating PSD/PS cycle), could always be managed. 
 The postponement of regional institutions therefore means that regional issues 
were not really considered worthwhile. Having no intermediary platform to con-
sider, strategies, negotiations and coalitions of actors are constituted either in 
relation to local arenas or national configurations. 
 Several mayors and directors of the Coordination Commissions provide good 
examples of this, in particular in the Algarve and Northern regions, or the city 
of Porto, traditional bastions of regional voices. Although defending regional insti-
tutions, they almost invariably abandoned them when their careers reached central 
administration, repressing the impulse towards regionalization. When the actors 
appointed to ministerial posts are those who have made successful careers in the 
cities or regional administrations (CCRs), the territorial ‘lifeblood’ is drained away, 
as a consequence of the departure of elites that would have been well placed to 
assume regional leadership. 
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 The ‘Sanctity’ of Local Powers 
 Tradition legitimised this situation. In the oldest and most homogeneous nation 
state in Europe8, two sole major historical continuities can be identified, the cen-
tral and the municipal. Not surprisingly, local powers have absorbed most of the 
decentralization impetus in the democratic period, in such a way that the features 
of this rebirth of the local – characterised by highly personalised forms of govern-
ment (Grémion 1976, Ruivo 2000) and longstanding client relationships, parallel 
to huge competition between the municipalities for access to the state administra-
tion – become one of the main obstacles for the regions and the viability of more 
efficient forms of territorial organization. As Reis noted (2004a), one of the con-
sequences of ‘municipal constitutionalism’ has been the ‘poverty of territory’ in 
Portugal. Local powers have always been hostile to regional power: 
“Local power is a-regional and anti-regional. There is no solidarity between these 
restricted areas [. . .] the leading municipal groups [. . .] are totally independent of each 
other, whilst dominating in their own limited areas. And from area to area there are 
balances of power, since there has never been anyone powerful enough to break up 
the social structure to their own advantage. Such an attempt to alter the current situ-
ation would subordinate one oligarchy to another – through the creation of capitals – and 
no one has been prepared to make such a sacrifice.” (Magalhães & Coelho 1986: 35) 
 Dominated by atomistic orientations, displaying a poor history of working together 
and with no notion of a shared destiny, regional spaces have become mosaics of 
competing localisms. Local political values and orientations permanently reproduce 
the effects of fragmentation and inter-municipal competitiveness that explain the 
weakness of regional ambitions and are, moreover, used by the state to consolidate 
its own centrality, disregarding visions of more advanced forms of territorial orga-
nization. Such a situation is coherent with the dominant paradigm of local power, 
whose inspiration is that of the Napoleonic ‘local administration’ (dependent on 
the centre) rather than one of true autonomy of ‘local government’ (Mabileau et 
al. 1987: 13). 
 It should also be noted that that Portuguese society is based on strong socio-
territorial segmentation (Medeiros 1988) and is extremely polymorphic. Attempts 
to preserve individual history, “their relative autonomy as a cultural identity and 
a form of social organization”, correspond to each spatial unit, meaning that inter-
regional or metropolitan ties may confront deep-rooted “principles of exclusion and 
opposition” (Ibid.: 151, 153). Socio-territorial differences are frequently superimposed 
onto cooperative or associative ventures for example, making inter-municipal 
association difficult. 
 Moreover, the hypertrophy of personalised power that defines local leadership 
is heightened by, amongst other reasons, the fact that the democratic  reconstruction 
8  Portugal is the oldest and most stable formation on the European political map. In Rokkan’s 
typology it is the only European state formed in the Middle Ages which does not display any 
socio-cultural ‘particularities’ within its borders and is unified both in terms of institutional 
structure and the level of ethno-linguistic homogeneity. The only comparable case in Europe, 
in terms of the absence of ethnic minorities, is Iceland, formed in the 20th century (R  & 
U  1987: 89). 
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of local power has been marked by a serious state financial crisis. The state under 
decentralization is also a state in fiscal crisis, in which financial restrictions seri-
ously affect the exercise of local government obligations, making Portugal the 
country with the lowest percentage of public spending administered by local gov-
ernment in Europe – not even 10% of the total. In addition, the funding for 
municipal budgets comes mainly from the State budget via the Financial Equilibrium 
Fund (FEF, Fundo de Equilíbrio Financeiro). 
 In these circumstances, local politicians seek to overcome their difficulties by 
using special contacts with different departments and actors in the state adminis-
tration. Knowing how effective informal exchanges can be, they aim to achieve 
through personal means that which a merely formal claim will not accomplish. 
Networking has become the mechanism available to the local political class to 
circumnavigate their hierarchical relationship with the centre and the inadequacies 
of the bureaucratic framework, as well as the financial reasons often invoked by 
the state for restricting their resources – “it involves networks of friendships, 
political networks, contacts, shared complicity in administrative levels and inside 
knowledge, particularly through family ties, which in our country (and in many 
others) has acquired incalculable importance in resolving problems at various 
levels of social life, particularly in terms of channelling resources to local govern-
ments and accelerating bureaucratic procedures” (Ruivo 1991: 198). The issue 
here is that the ability to draw on personal networking as a way of obtaining 
resources is something that not all mayors possess in equal measure and it can 
lead to disparate responses and outcomes, resulting in municipalities being very 
unevenly supplied with various collective facilities and assets. 
 Fuelling the system 
 On entering the European Community in 1986, the political system had already 
been (re)centralized, although some progress had been made in terms of decen-
tralization. The influx of community funding did not substantially alter this but, 
in fact, enabled it to continue. It seemed that all the tasks involving the modern-
ization of the country could be pursued through the relatively closed and person-
alised connections between local and central authorities. From this point, however, 
all that was needed was what Mathiot (1998: 88) has termed 
“. . . acculturation à l’Europe, qui s’apparente moins à la constitution ou à la fabrication d’un nou-
veau système d’action qu’à l’incorporation au système existant de ‘ce qu’il faut d’Europe’ pour 
apparaître à Bruxelles comme un partenaire fiable et donc susceptible d’être aidé.”
 In order to fulfil this and respect Community pressures to define and implement 
projects on a regional level, the state reinvested in its deconcentrated regional 
structures: the Commissions for Regional Coordination. Regional planning and 
the activities of the CCRs therefore witnessed “a veritable explosion” after Portugal 
joined the European Community (EC) (Martins 1997: 110). The ‘superministry’ 
of Planning and Regional Administration was created and regional development 
has been made autonomous within the central administration, “to ensure an 
interface with the EC”. Inside the CCR, the ‘Regional Council’, representing all 
the municipalities in a region, emerged, holding consultancy powers in relation to 
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projects financed by the Community. Regional planning has begun to “integrate 
a Community element into its operations” (Ibid.). 
 The role attributed to the five CCR (North, Centre, Lisbon and Tejo Valley, 
Alentejo, Algarve) regarding Community funding is important because it strength-
ens the only pole of regional life in the country. In fact, when people refer to 
regions in Portugal, they normally mean the functions and the areas covered by 
the Commissions for Regional Coordination. Although they are part of the (decon-
centrated) state administration, the Coordination Commissions have promoted an 
important regional dynamic, involving local authorities. They represent a decisive 
technical support structure for the municipalities and are especially designated to 
prepare them for accessing European funding. A regional sense of action is always 
inherent in the technical and administrative routines of the CCRs. Despite being 
technocratic organizations, they are nevertheless devoted to making micro-territo-
rial agents interiorise the Community logics of action: 
“L’application des fonds structurels européens a ainsi mis clairement en évidence le rapport étroit entre 
la qualité du partenariat Commissions de Coordination Régionales/municipalités et les taux d’exécution 
de ces programmes.” (Reis & Négrier 1998: 171) 
 The presidents of the CCRs in particular, even if chosen and supervised by the 
Planning and Regional Administration Minister in Lisbon, have usually ended up 
attempting a characteristically regional form of leadership. A certain notion of 
regional interest has gradually emerged through their efforts to promote cohesion 
amongst sub-regional areas – involving dialogue with the municipalities to encour-
age them to integrate their projects – and through their ‘external’ representation 
of the region. The CCRs therefore represent more than the mere technocratic 
exercise of deconcentrated state authority. They constitute a crucial stage in regional 
experiences and projects. Some of them, particularly in the north, were later to 
provide various governments with some of their most famous ministers, such as 
Valente de Oliveira of the PSD, or Elisa Ferreira and Braga da Cruz of the PS. 
 Although integrated into the centralist, vertical and bureaucratic state system, 
the way in which CCRs operate allows them to develop strategic informality in 
areas which extend beyond the judicial-administrative scope of the state apparatus. 
In this sense, they configure an embryonic regional system, introducing relational 
density into an organization that still lacks sufficient territorial recognition. Following 
the creation of the Regional-based Incentive Scheme (SIBR)9 as part of the 
Community Support Framework II (QCA II)10 managed by the CCRs, efforts to 
build regional partnerships have intensified. 
 For a better understanding of the role of the CCRs, two aspects must be con-
sidered; their internal and their ‘external’ action. In the latter, mediation between 
various Community programmes and territorial agents should be highlighted. 
Several opportunities for ‘European socialisation’ via cooperation projects in the 
EU, such as opportunities for cross-border cooperation, have been made acces-
sible to local actors through the activities of the CCRs. 
 9  Sistema de Incentivos de Base Regional. 
10  Quadro Comunitário de Apoio II, 1994-1999. 
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 From a territorial point of view, examples of ‘Europeanization’ impacts, usually 
involving the CCRs, include closer ties with the Galician region through the 
“Comunidade de Trabalho Galiza-Região Norte de Portugal” (“Galicia-Northern Region 
of Portugal Working Community”) and between the cities of the “Eixo Atlântico”, 
at the heart of the so-called Euro-region, as well as links between both the North 
and Centre and Castilla e Leon, or even the Atlantic Arc11 (combined with other 
more sectoral initiatives, related to tourism, for example). The various Interregs*, 
in particular, represent a remarkable form of Luso-Spanish cooperation, promot-
ing cross-border integration where territorial actors (the municipalities, development 
agencies, and universities) play a leading part. 
 The north of the country was to become very active in this matter, recreating 
historical and cultural affinities suspended during the Iberian dictatorships and the 
democratic reconstruction of both countries. As part of the attempts to foster 
inter-regional dynamics and establish a Galician-Portuguese lobby in Brussels – 
achieved, for instance, through links between municipalities on both sides of the 
border, such as the Comunidade Territorial de Cooperação do Vale do Minho (Vale do 
Minho Cooperative Territorial Community) – there was an agreement between 
the Xunta de Galicia and the North CCR represented by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 
the Galician regional leader, and Manuel Braga da Cruz, President of the Northern 
CCR. Despite an evident institutional asymmetry, reflecting the different repre-
sentational status of a president of an autonomous region elected by popular vote 
vis-à-vis a ‘technocrat’ appointed by the government, this did not prevent coop-
eration and trust between both territories from developing. 
 It should be noted, however, that the effects of cooperation between Galicia 
and the North (or other Portuguese regions and their European counterparts) on 
the political, namely regional, representation of territories, entail contradictory 
aspects. On the one hand, it allowed supporters of the regions, especially the 
northern ones, to use the institutional discrepancy between Galicia and the North 
to demonstrate the urgent need for regional government in Portugal, emphasising 
the obstacles Portugal faces in not having authentic regional structures. On the 
other hand, it also served those who opposed the regional project. They empha-
sised that the efforts of the CCRs and their executives in regional leadership, both 
internally and externally, prove that there is no real need for an elected regional 
administration. Whatever the interpretation, it is clear that the emerging leadership 
provided by the CCRs extended beyond the strictly technocratic functions ascribed 
to the regional commissions and placed them at the centre of a stimulating, ter-
ritorialized form of politics. 
 As far as CCR intra-regional activities are concerned, two major obstacles must 
be considered (Reis & Négrier 1998). The first involves areas dominated pre-
dominantly by one form of activity, such as tourism or industry, which have their 
own channels of (functional) representation, with no particular interest in a ter-
ritorial approach. The second concerns the miscellany of actors and interests 
operating within local contexts. Due to a deficient regional structuring of the 
11  A federation of the coastal regions of countries such as Great Britain, France, Portugal and 
Spain. 
*  Editor’s note: Interreg is one of the European Community Initiative Programmes. 
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interests, necessary to “play the partnership, as defined by Brussels”, the CCRs 
became responsible for a significant part of the supra-municipal coordination related 
to ‘European’ projects. The problem is that they have to accomplish it in what 
has become a highly politicised environment, provoked by the fact that initiatives 
benefiting from Community funding become a means of legitimising locally elected 
officials. This does not mask the importance of the CCRs in promoting partner-
ships or acting as guardians of community norms but, in fact, consolidates local 
systems as the major frames of reference for Community policies. Simultaneously, 
the reciprocal legitimation of state actors and local elites through other projects, 
many also Community-funded, has reinforced the existing centre-periphery system. 
Even if the CCRs, who manage around 20% of the structural funds, have intro-
duced a certain regional methodology, this has not substantially changed the 
existing system of territorial representation. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the CCRs favour territorial dynamics, being close 
to local forces and sharing the values underpinning their activities, the reality is 
that local powers are too heterogeneous and fragmented, expressing a sense of 
disaffection simultaneously vis-à-vis Community norms and the fate of the regions, 
all of which makes regional planning difficult. In the words of a former President 
of the CCR Centro: 
“If we ask the overwhelming majority of political officials in the region what the 
CSF III Centre Region objectives and strategies are, I would be very happy if just 
a small percentage of them could answer the question clearly. I am sure that the 
vast majority would not know what to say, because they have not been involved in 
the planning.”12 
 Sub-regional competition, developed between rival cities, has worsened the scenario: 
“What must not happen is a situation where people are going around saying that the 
Viseu objectives have got nothing to do with the Coimbra ones, or the Leiria ones 
have nothing to do with those of Aveiro. If that continues to happen we will never 
be a politically valid region.”
 The modernization of the administration 
 The process of modernizing the administration, which territorial authorities were 
supposed to undertake in order to deal with European projects, is related to the 
difficulties in renewing territorial representation. It is known that the possibility of 
the local authorities seeing their territories included in cohesion and development 
policies will depend, to a great extent, on the human and technical investments 
they make in order to attract these policies (Marks et al. 1996, Benington 1994). 
The complexity of Community programmes, requiring specialized knowledge in very 
different areas, added to the fact that European legislation is constantly evolving, 
makes the issue of local government modernization and organizational restructur-
ing a crucial indicator of its involvement in community policies. 
 Conscious of the weak indicators concerning local government technical and 
human resources, in a recent study (Ruivo & Francisco 2003) we questioned local 
12  Interview at the CCRC, April 2004. 
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officials about the organizational changes they implemented in order to adapt most 
efficiently to the opportunities offered by the EU. 
 Three types of investment were considered: human resources, technological 
modernization and the creation of an office dedicated to deal with Community 
programmes. The overwhelming majority of the municipalities – 75.2% – said 
that they had introduced changes when structural funding arrived, 18.3% responded 
that they had not introduced anything new into their functioning. 
 In general, however, the results reveal a limited local government restructuring 
in relation to ‘Europe’. The modernization of services merely meant computeris-
ing existing services and had little to do with innovations in administrative prac-
tices, in particular those meaning a greater openness and transparency in 
decision-making. Greater administrative efficiency was sought within traditional 
cognitive frameworks – the personification of power in the figure of the mayor 
(so-called local Ceasarism) and a functional dependency in relation to the state, 
accentuated throughout access to European funding. 
 A closer analysis led us to further conclusions. The material difficulties many 
local officials claimed as the explanation for inadequate modernization following 
Community requirements revealed, on a deeper level, a poor awareness of Europe 
and its underlying principles13. This reinforces the tendency to engender scepticism 
regarding the cost/benefit relationship of the ‘European’ option. The lack of local 
government staff, an alleged explanation for the difficulties in dealing with 
‘European’ projects must be seen in the light of their overall disinterest in European 
matters. 
 In fact, although municipal officials may address the state administration for 
elucidation and technical support regarding Community funding, a general lack 
of information required for decision-making can still be noticed. Even allowing 
for recent developments in human resources, the organizational gap between 
central and local administration has widened, given the successive transfer of 
competences to local entities and the complexity of bureaucratic procedures intro-
duced by Europe. European integration therefore resurrects the spectre of the grau 
zero do poder local (Mozzicafreddo & Guerra 1988). 
 As far as local authorities are concerned, the feeling of belonging and being 
part of Europe – strong, according to our research – is not accompanied by an 
equivalent experience of the principles and styles of government associated with 
European practices. This happens, amongst other factors, because the encounter 
between Brussels policies – such as regional development – and the territories is 
invariably mediated by state officials, as unsurpassable figures in European pro-
grammes. The chance for Europe to encourage forms of territorial governance, 
where arrangements of public and private actors emerge associated with identity 
and cohesion within a territorial system, able to perform coherent external strat-
egies, is therefore remote. In countries with a strong centralist tradition, such as 
Portugal, the prospective for local or regional interests continues to fundamentally 
depend on the type of relationship maintained with the state, since it holds the 
basic financial, bureaucratic and technical competences to execute public policies. 
13  Confusion or a basic lack of knowledge concerning the meaning of the subsidiarity and 
partnership principles was widespread amongst the local officials we interviewed. 
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The Portuguese case reveals undoubtedly that the modernising of infrastructures 
unleashed by European integration has strengthened the role of the state (Reis 
2004b). All issues attached to European policies (transport and mobility infrastruc-
tures, science and technology programmes, competition policies and even more 
clearly, economic and social cohesion policies, articulated to regional and urban 
development) were centralised in the state. This fact made European integration 
a highly political and institutional matter. Civil society, once again, revealed its 
extreme dependency on interaction settings created by central government. 
 The low investment of non-state actors in representation strategies focused on 
Brussels is therefore not surprising. Europe has actually functioned more as an 
inhibiting arena for Portuguese subnational authorities and organizations, which 
are too sensitive of their political and institutional weaknesses in terms of their 
capacity to influence the distribution of benefits in Europe. A more active involve-
ment in the European project seems unlikely, confirming the passive and sceptical 
attitude that makes learning about Europe difficult. As Goldsmith & Klausen 
stressed (1997: 239, 240), 
“such local governments lack even the elementary internal coordination necessary to 
deal with the EU and its vast outpourings of matters relevant to local government 
[. . .] Local politicians are likely to view the EU and its bureaucracy with suspicion 
and refuse to deal with them at any level above that which is required by law. They 
may regard other municipalities in the same way and thus refuse to cooperate with 
them [. . .] This blinkered outlook also inhibits both the politicians and paid officials 
from learning about the EU and adapting their behaviour accordingly [. . .] both 
politicians and officers take a view either that there is little in Europe for them, that 
they are too small to deal with Europe, or that they had better wait and see what 
happens before doing anything [. . .] The process by which these local governments 
are adapting and adjusting to European integration is thus extremely incremental.”
 The parameters suggested by Europe are therefore mainly assumed, by social and 
territorial elites, amidst passive attitudes, which confirm longstanding practices of 
a certain obscurity in our relations with Europe 
“ we are in the European project but we are still not part of the European project 
[. . .] In the case of structural and cohesion funds, we have let them become victims 
of pervasive corruption, burying them in cement and concrete rather than putting 
them to the service of an educational and scientific-technological turnaround that 
would enable us to assume the European project as if it truly belonged to us. Therefore, 
we are in it, but from the outside, more like visitors than hosts.” (Santos 2003: 40) 
 The Persistent Path of Territorial Disparities 
 In a subtle way we have witnessed in recent years a questioning of the role played 
by structural funds in Portuguese development. This is still simply a matter of 
isolated opinions, emerging sporadically through the media or in specialist debates. 
Whilst not challenging the prevailing opinion, crediting European funding as the 
major impulse behind progress in recent decades, they express, nevertheless, dis-
comfort with the signs of mitigated success, if not failure, in the application of 
Community funding. This is particularly true if we bear in mind the successful 
cases of Ireland and Spain under similar circumstances. Comparisons have even 
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been made between European funding and the gold from Brazil in the 18th century, 
whose damaging effects on the country’s modernization are well-known. How can 
such a singular appraisal of European support be explained? 
 Community funds were expected to stimulate the development of the country 
as a whole. However, one of the requisites of their allocation involved combating 
territorial disparities, namely within the regional framework proposed in Brussels 
for cohesion and ERDF funding14. The trend of the Portuguese economy towards 
‘littoralisation’ and ‘metropolisation’, in a country that concentrates its wealth along 
a narrow strip of coastal land and in the Lisbon area, leaving the interior deserted, 
was to be corrected and, if possible reversed, via the application of these funds. 
 Twenty years later the asymmetries between regions in Portugal have intensified. 
The sharpest contrast is represented by the disparities between Lisbon and the 
Tejo Valley and other Portuguese regions. The fact that numerous investments in 
modernization projects (particularly associated with the 1998 Universal Exhibition) 
have been channelled into the capital, either through Community programmes or 
through specific central administration funding, has increased this discrepancy. 
 The idea was to install the more dynamic sectors of Portuguese economy in 
Lisbon, so that they could operate from the capital as the driving force for mod-
ernising the whole country – a ‘diffusionist’ model that has not produced the 
expected results. One of the recent outcomes, after Lisbon and the Tejo Valley 
achieved a GDP per capita of 75% of the Community average15, was the decision 
to integrate the municipalities of Lezíria and Médio Tejo (corresponding to 80% 
of the region’s area and 25% of its population, but displaying development indi-
cators far below that of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area and therefore unable to 
access Community funds because they were situated in the same region as Lisbon), 
into the Alentejo and Central regions. 
 The demographic and economic disparities in Portugal must be related to the 
almost exclusive logic of party-based political representation, paralleled by forms 
of economic representation weakly autonomous in relation to the state. Reserving 
no place for territorial, namely regional, forms of intervention16, the centre- periphery 
system in Portugal continues to be essentially restricted to state/municipality 
exchanges. Divided between central administrations that Europe has made more 
powerful, and fragmented municipalities, whose forceful demands often led to the 
scattering of investments that should have served regional structuring, the model 
of governance in Portugal is essentially ‘statist’ (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999). The 
mere episodic and state-controlled activation of local powers’ participation in decision-
making obstructs any effective pattern of horizontal governance, federating functional 
and territorial actors. Moreover, this scheme tends to reproduce traditional forms 
of inequality, arbitrariness and opacity. Remaining closed to a more ‘territorialized’ 
14  ERDF, European Regional Development Fund. The five planning regions corresponding 
to the CCR areas (North, Central, Lisbon and Tejo Valley, Alentejo and Algarve), all classified 
as NUT II (NUT or NUTS, Nomenclature of Territorial Units [for Statistics]). 
15  Removing it from the Objective 1 regions and correspondent funding. 
16  R  & N égrier (1998) denounce a situation in which the hypertrophy of the party-political 
logic has blocked the formation of a territorial culture. 
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and participatory model of development, this configuration often disguises its 
inadequacies and contradictions with financial contributions from Europe. 
 From the point of view of inter-regional equity, one of our interviewees postu-
lated very clearly: 
“Most of the economic development that takes place in the European Union is done 
nowadays through the regions. Since we do not have regions, the whole country has 
been chosen for ERDF purposes. And since the regions do not legally exist, something 
remarkable has happened in Portugal: the most developed region, Lisbon and the 
Tejo Valley, is the one that has benefited most from the European Community. The 
regions that need the funding most, and who, if they had their own voice, not just 
in Lisbon but also in Brussels, could legitimately claim it, are the ones that suffer 
[. . .]. What happens because we don’t have regions? The government of the Republic, 
the state, has for the most part become the regional government of Lisbon. The 
majority of what should be Lisbon and Tejo Valley, or Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 
competences are state competences. And they monopolise the resources, in the name 
of the state, for the Lisbon region.”
 Certainly, something of a reorganization in the central administration has occurred 
in order to adapt to managing Community programmes at a regional level. 
However, apart from representing a small amount of the CSF, regional programmes 
acquired essentially a local significance. In general, the tendency has been towards 
“greater centralisation of the responsibilities in the central administration, when 
regional politics actually needed the exact opposite” (Martins 1997: 119). 
 In addition, this overall framework does not hide more widespread inequalities 
at the heart of the centre-periphery arrangement. This is the case, for example, 
because 
“ criteria for the distribution of funds respect the disparities of the ex-FEF. Or, in 
other words, municipalities already receiving more from the central administration will 
also receive more from Brussels. On the other hand, the projects also respect the local 
perspective. Since all local officials have to show their involvement in projects, the 
complaints all revolve around the old issue of money.”17 
 * * * 
 In conclusion, the absence of a regionalization process and inadequate decentral-
ization led to the paradox of Central Administration being the only existing space 
for regional socialisation. Furthermore, adding to the strict dependence of the 
territories on the Centre, the discontinuity and ‘chaos’ (Moreira 2005) character-
ising territorial circumscriptions of the public administration must be emphasised. 
The dramatic disjunction between different levels and sectoral spheres of the state 
has blocked any concerted form of territorial action. Territories have the most 
disparate institutional configurations, leading to disconnected actions and strategies, 
rather than the building of an integrated regional (and national) space. 
 Finally, rather than meaning greater participation for social/territorial interests in 
decision-making, the territorial implementation of policies such as the Community 
regional policy merely proves that any appeal for social or local forces to participate 
in these processes conforms to their dependent status towards the national  authorities 
17  R  1999: 59. 
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(a persistent ‘path dependency’). Equally, it permits the continuity of a pattern of 
interaction dominated by the figure of the local ‘power broker’, namely the mayor, 
who monopolises communications with the ‘outside’ and makes external ‘gains’ (such 
as Community funding) the evidence of his political and personal merit. 
 This illustrates the persistence of a ‘classic’ political exchange system, based on 
the premise of ‘gains for all’, even if not equally, on an unrestricted environment 
where a belief in the logic of reciprocity dominates. The emergence of collective 
territorial actors playing an active role in Community affairs becomes an unlikely 
prospect. Acting as the only valid figure between European Commission and the 
territories and serving as a ‘gatekeeper’ for Community financing and opportuni-
ties, the state administrations impose significant limitations on local powers, par-
ticularly in terms of access to European bodies and their power to distribute funds. 
From this perspective, the Europeanization of Portuguese policy-making represents, 
at best, a ‘minimal Europeanization’ (Getimis & Paraskevopoulos 2002). 
 Obviously, ‘European socialisation’ of territorial agents and their involvement 
in transnational cooperation, promoted by CCRs, must not be neglected. Once 
again, it does not introduce significant changes either in the forms of territorial 
representation or modernization in subnational administrations. On the contrary, 
following entry into the EU, there has been a clear recentring of the state and 
increased opacity within the political system. This happens because, 
“in Portugal the European institutions – which are relatively opaque and insufficiently 
representative – do not encounter a strong parliament, active regional states, parties 
with long traditions, or solid civic institutions as they do in Germany, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, and other countries. In Portugal those institutions encounter a weak 
civil society and a secretive state that is relatively inaccessible to citizens.” (Barreto 
1999: 114) 
 More than in any other country, European projects are 
“the exclusive responsibility of the state, even when they involve private firms or local 
authorities. When such projects are financed by European funds, their management 
becomes centralized. This means that a large proportion of public and private produc-
tive investment, as well as infrastructure construction of any size, is undertaken with 
European support and state approval or not at all. European subsidies and funding, 
which are fully administered by the state, lie at the root of total political control over 
investment. Hence, bearing in mind that investments without European backing ipso 
facto lose some of their competitiveness, European backing for modernization and 
development has considerably increased the political and technical powers of the 
administration with no counterweight or moderating exerted by civil society or elected 
bodies.” (Ibid.: 115) 
 The weak democratic traditions in the country, the fragility of a civil society depend-
ing on state protection, the absence of local or regional institutions corresponding 
to significant territorial identities and socio-economic coherent spaces, coupled with 
the extreme disaffection of Portuguese society towards Community affairs are fac-
tors that strengthen the state’s role as the only ‘European’ actor, as well as the 
electoral or party political appropriation of Europe by the central powers. 
 The viability of the European project seems therefore to continue subject to an 
inter-state logic. The fact that Community policies – especially regional ones – 
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remain within the framework of national political and administrative systems, 
enables Member States, although relatively ‘drained’ of certain competencies, to 
reconstruct their centrality. The principle of subsidiarity, for instance, encapsulates 
a polysemic meaning and a versatility making it easily manipulated by the various 
actors (the European Commission, the Member States and the subnational actors). 
Although it might contribute to the reinforcement of subnational levels of govern-
ment and the emergence of innovative political approaches, in cases such as the 
Portuguese, the prevailing interpretation is established by the state itself. The 
national administration defines and reunites the partners considered relevant, 
imposing the terms under which participation takes place and maintaining its own 
propositions as binding references. 
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